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whole doctrine of taking the goods of A to pay the debts of B, because B transferred to A with intent to defraud, must go back to it alone, and cannot be traced into any principle of equity, to say nothing of any rule of the common law. The result is that, in discussing the subject of Fraudulent Conveyances, it is necessary sharply to draw the line around its particular province. Many cases of fraud upon creditors' rights really fall within doctrines belonging to equity, but no real case of fraudulent conveyance, such as was contemplated by the Statute, can be adjudged on any principle save the positive rule which Queen Elizabeth's Parliament put into the law of the land.

In effect all the doctrines governing the rights of creditors in the property of their debtor reduce themselves to a few simple principles. The true doctrine of fraudulent conveyances, as enacted by the Statute of Elizabeth, may be expressed in the rule that a man cannot transfer his property, except for a fair consideration, where he is already insolvent or will be rendered so by the transaction in question. When a case does not contain these elements, then it must be decided on some other principle of law. It is not, strictly, the case of a fraudulent conveyance.

Thus under the head of estoppel would come the entire doctrine of reputed ownership, where one, really the owner of property, permits another to act as though it were his and thus gain credit upon the strength of that apparent ownership. The rule which forbids spendthrift trusts in most states, as pointed out by Professor Gray, is properly classified under the law relating to restraints upon alienation. These instances will perhaps suffice, without mention of the delicate shadings between the statutory doctrine of fraudulent conveyances and the equitable doctrine of reputed ownership, presented by many cases dealing with the rights of subsequent creditors (e. g. *Todd v. Nelson*, 109 N. Y. 316). It is to be hoped that some day all of these distinctions, and many others which would suggest themselves in the consideration of such a subject, will receive more discussion than is accorded them in the book before us.

The value of the present edition would be greater if the present commentator had brought his authorities more nearly down to date. We do not find in the notes which have been added since the last edition, many of the authorities which have been given to us by the activities of the Federal Courts under the present Bankruptcy Act. Nor do we find, in the discussion of chattel mortgages, the case of *Skilton v. Coddington* (185 N. Y. 80) already often cited.

However, all these things will doubtless come in time. The worth of the present book will some time demand a new edition and it is to be hoped that then these cases will receive their proper mention, together with such future decisions as may meanwhile appear upon a subject which, as Coke long ago predicted, would always keep pace with the expanding orbit of fraudulent contrivances.

G. G.

INDEX ANALYSIS OF THE FEDERAL STATUTES, 1789-1873. By MIDDLETON G. BEAMAN and A. K. MCNAMARA. Washington: GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE. 1911.

The present is a praiseworthy and successful effort to furnish a much needed guide to the mazes of the U. S. Statutes at Large, from the days of the fathers to a comparatively recent period. It was not

until recent years that any serious attempt was made to compile the Federal Statutes for the use of the profession. An unofficial undertaking which resulted in the U. S. Compiled Statutes of 1901, with a Supplement covering recent legislation to 1909, has proven of so much use that the present index will probably not receive the welcome that its intrinsic worth demands. It bears, however, every evidence of care and will be an ultimate resort for the careful practitioner who will not be satisfied with anything short of the official, until such time as the long hoped-for revision of the National Statute law is given to the public.

G. G.

ANCIENT, CURIOUS, AND FAMOUS WILLS. By VIRGIL M. HARRIS. Boston: LITTLE BROWN AND Co. 1911. pp. xiii, 472.

While this book contains little that is worth serious study, it shows great pains in collecting and arranging a mass of fugitive material that will furnish reading for one looking for amusement or for an anecdote illustrative of the vagaries of testators.

For historical purposes it falls far short of such a book as Furnival's "Fifty Earliest English Wills" or such a collection as "Maine Wills." And for forms it is inferior to Remsen's.

The same industry in collecting, if applied to reproducing accurate and complete transcripts of a part of the many wills only referred to or only incompletely given would have resulted in a far more useful if less entertaining book.

N. A.